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It might be wise to stop here. Even a reader who is sympathetic to
jurisprudential imagination must regard the communicable part of my
title with considerable misgiving. For he or she can hardly be unaware of
the double jeopardy in which the general theorist of law places himself
when dealing with socialist legal systems. The first has been aptly
described by Alasdair MacIntyre in his parable of a man who aspired to
be the author of the general theory of holes.' The moral of the story, that
the concept of a hole is a poor foundation for a general theory that would
explain all holes, is, to put it mildly, not devalued by the fact that, in
construing a theory of socialist legal systems, one may lack concepts of
both socialism and law, not to speak of the concept of a legal system.
The second source of danger can be detected without a meta-
theoretical enlightenment: at the time the main part of this paper was
written, in September 1989, the first non-communist prime minister in
the Soviet bloc, in Poland, barely passed the Kremlin's acid test of
reliability: by early February 1990, when the finishing touches are being
added to the present version of this paper, all communist parties in
Eastern Europe (and even some in the Soviet Baltic) have renounced
their monopoly on power and seem to be ready to face democratic
national elections. By the time this article appears in print, the Soviet
Union, which is threatened by secessionist, non-Russian Soviet republics
and nations, may no longer exist within the boundaries and with the
regime that have constituted it since 1917. But if one nonetheless insists
on a meta-theoretical explanation of the obvious, one can find it stated
*Ivan L. Padjen, B.A., B.C.L. (Zag.), LL.M. (Dal.) S.J.D. (Liub.); Docent of the Theory of
State and Law & Methodology of Social Sciences, Faculty of Law, Rijeka University; in 1989-
90 Visiting Researcher at McGill Law Faculty and Fulbright Scholar at Yale Law School.
**A revised version of lectures held at Dalhousie Law School on October 1 and 2, 1989. 1 owe
some of the ideas on the nature of socialist societies which are expressed in this paper to
Professors Zarko Puhovski, Eugen Pusic and Ivo Prpic of Zagreb University. Possible
misinterpretations and errors are solely mine.
1. A. MacIntyre, "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible" in Id., Beyond the Self-
Images oftheAge (London: Duchworth, 1971), at 260.
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bluntly in Kirchmann's notorious pamphlet On the Worthlessness of
Jurisprudence as a Science, where it is said that libraries of legal science
are by a dash of the legislative pen trans-substantiated into waste paper.2
Although it might be wise to stop, I will go on. An academic jurist in
a socialist country, who has switched from the study of constitutional law
to legal theory (as quite a few have, because no constitution could be
identified in the country, and what could be identified as operative rules
did not seem to be legal enough to be conceptualized as public law and
were definitely not public enough to be referred to without peril in
academic publications) 3 can as little refrain from speculating about law in
his political habitat as the proverbial Wittgensteinian skeptic can stop
doing philosophy. Potential readers, on the other hand, have not
necessarily displayed greater self-control. Many non-academics as well as
legal scholars, most notably western students of comparative law, have
also speculated about the nature of law in socialist societies, even when
factual information about the subject was negligible and when theories
had no discernible practical consequences. Are we indeed to infer from
the sudden disappearance of the hammer, sickle and other symbols of
communist power that libraries of socialist and comparative legal
scholarship have become waste paper? And to the extent that they have,
is not the reason that they have never had much cognitive value?
These queries indicate that there exists a good reason for, and a
manageable subject-matter for this inquiry. Rather than socialist legal
systems, the subject matter is theories about their nature. They are
something we can (still) put our fingers on. For the time being, they
represent the only conceptual framework for the study of laws from the
2. Kirchmann's phantom pamphlet (originally entitled O]ber die Wertlosigkeit der
Jurisprudenz als Wssenschat and published in the late 19th century), which is no longer read
but is still frequently referred to, is by informed legal scholars commonly regarded as a
grotesque misunderstanding of the nature of legal science. Grotesque as it may be, its central
argument may be more universally valid than it is assumed. Thus a professor of Eastern
European government and politics was recently reported to worry that her students might
"answer a question on an exam incorrectly, and then tell me later 'Well, it was in the book'.
It's very important now that a student takes into account what has been happening".
"Professors, Students Scramble to Keep Up with Events in East Europe: Text Books and
Journals are Rendered Increasingly Out of Date Each Day as Students and Teachers Deal with
History in the Making" (December 6, 1989), The McGill Reporter, 5. The article has been
brought to my attention by colleagues from a faculty of medicine, who have been passing in
through their department with comments which inadvertently - but I suspect: not
inappropriately - reiterated the gist of Kirchmann's argument.
3. See ag., Ivan Padjen and Bozidar Bakotic, Vanjski: poslovi Jugoslavie, sa stajalista
medjunarodnog i poredbenog prava, s osobitim osrtom na federalno uredjenje/Yugoslav
Foreign Affairs: An International and Comparative Legal Study of Federalism! (Cakovec:
Zrinski, 1972).
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Elbe to the Pacific and they will remain to serve in that capacity at least
till the moment that socialist insignia are stripped off the Soviet flag. And
for this reason they may be problematic and in need of revision,
retroactive as well as prospective.
This essay, therefore, is to be not merely a theoretical, but a "meta-
theoretical' introduction into (ex)socialist legal systems. It -will state a
major problem of the theory of comparative law, outline some prominent
solutions to it, analyze their assumptions, and offer alternative
perspectives and solutions.
The problem traditionally has been formulated in, roughly, the
following way: are legal systems which have evolved in Eastern
European socialist countries since the First World War merely a variant
within the family or type of civil law systems? Or are socialist legal
systems a distinct legal family or type, with a common core that differs
from Western European civil law systems as well as from common law
systems, Islamic legal systems, Hindu laws, and so on?
4
Section 1 of this paper will be concerned with some explicit and
implicit criteria for the analysis and comparison of legal systems and with
their applicability to the study of socialist systems. The latter task
requires, needless to explain, not only an alternative approach to the
problem in abstracto, but also a different interpretation of the place of
law in socialist countries. Section 2 will address the main problem of the
study by focusing on the role of legal theory or doctrine in socialist
systems. Thus the study will in both principle parts descend from an
analysis of other theories to explicit theorizing about the nature of
socialist legal orders. Section 3 will abandon not only the "meta-
theoretical" but also the "theoretical" stance and engage in an expressly
"practical" discourse, concerning, again, legal theory.5 Starting from the
findings in previous sections that problems of socialist legal systems are
largely problems of legal scholarship, which, if anything, cannot be
solved by a dash of the pen, the concluding part of the paper will propose
a set of measures for a "jurisprudential recovery" of what until recently
has been, and has largely remained, the world run by "communists and
their laws", and for a parallel recovery of western scholarship concerned
with socialist legal systems.
4. For a brief discussion of the relevance and main approaches to the problem see V.A.
Tumanov, "On Comparing Various Types of Legal Systems", in WE. Butler and V.N.
Kudriavtsev, ed., Comparative Law andLegal System (New York: Oceana, 1985), 69 at 70-72;
see also a systematic analysis of the approaches.
5. The distinction between the theoretical and practical (not to speak of the meta-theoretical)
level of legal discourse is, of course, far-fetched, but a part of (at least) the continental tradition
of legal scholarship. See, e.g., I. Padjen, "The Root of Legal Theory" (1988), 8 Synthesis
Philosphica 235.
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IL Cfiteria of Comparison and Socialist Legal Reality
Modern comparative legal research began at the end of the last century
as a practically and even technically, rather than cognitively or
theoretically oriented discipline.6 Its explicit aim was the unification of
private laws of industrially developed nations, which could facilitate
international traffic and commerce.7 Hence the focus of comparative
inquiries were differences between Roman-Germanic civil laws and
Anglo-American common laws. Since both types of legal systems
performed very similar social and almost identical economic functions,
and since those functions were not regarded as problematic, the subject-
matter of comparative legal inquiries could be narrowly conceived and
criteria for comparing different legal systems could be relatively simple
and expressly juristic.
The principal criterion for comparison was the nature of the so-called
sources of law. According to that criterion, Romano-Germanic systems
are created by legislators and, to some extent, by scholars, whereas
common law systems are made primarily by judges. The subsidiary
criterion was the internal structure of legal systems. According to that
criterion, the common law of contracts and the civil law of contracts are
comparable branches of law, whereas trust is a peculiarly common law
institution and obligations are a peculiarly civil law set of institutions.8
The two criteria have been usefully applied in the study of non-western
6. On the history of comparative legal scholarship see Leontin-Jean Constantinesco, Traitd de
droit compar4 t 1: Introduction au droit compard (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1972), livre 2e, at 50-94.
See also essays collected and edited by Konrad Zweigert und Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, Hrsg.,
Rechtsvergleichung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellischaft, 1976).
7. See Constantinesco, note 4, at 107.
8. The two criteria have become so deeply entrenched in the modem comparative legal
scholarship that they figure as the principal criteria of the multivolume, half completed,
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tubingen: Mohr and Paris: Mouton, 1970-)
[further- I.EC.L], which is prepared under the auspices of the International Association of
Legal Science and edited by an international board of comparatists from all major legal
systems. Thus, although R. David in "Introduction" of Structure and the Division of the Law
(I.E.C.L., vol. 2, ch. 2) - which presumably reveals theoretical underpinnings of the
Encyclopedia - stresses the necessity of functional approach in comparative legal studies and
suggests that "(i)t is often necessary to go beyond what is considered as being strictly speaking
the domain of law" (at 6), his brief "Introduction" (at 3-14) is concerned with little more than
sources and divisions of laws. The impression created by the "Introduction" is reinforced by
David's study Sources ofLaw (I.E.C.L., vol. 2, ch. 3), the only other - but lengthy (172 pp.)
- part of the Encyclopedia which can be interpreted as an exposition of the criteria of
comparison applicable in the comparison of all legal systems. The impression is, of course,
misleading, and should not be understand as a reflection of either the present state of
comparative legal scholarship or the criteria which are actually followed in numerous chapters
of the Encyclopedia. But it very probably reflects the minimal common denominator of the
scholarly traditions represented on the editorial board of LE.C.L.
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legal systems, for example, of Hindu and Islamic laws. But the emergence
and development of socialist systems created unforeseeable problems.
1. Jurisprudence, Contextualis, and TraditionalAssumptions
When the Soviet Union stabilized its newly created legal system in the
1930s, Western legal scholars noticed that the new system retained two
distinctive features of the Romano-Germanic legal family. Soviet law was
based on codes, with little or no room for judicial law-making (which
should not be confused with often vast discretionary powers of the Soviet
judiciary and the interference of the communist party apparatus in the
judicial process) and it was divided, though with some rearrangement,
into branches which exist in Romano-Germanic systems. 9 The similarity
between Romano-Germanic and socialist laws became even more
pronounced after the Second World War, when communist governments
of eight Eastern European nations adjusted their legal systems to the
Soviet model, 10 especially after 1961, when the Soviet leadership refused
influential proposals to amalgamate the civil and administrative law
regulating the organisation and operation of Soviet state enterprises into
a single branch of economic law."
However, Western legal scholars could not fail to see that, although the
internal structure of socialist legal systems had been derived from the civil
law type, socialist systems functioned in unprecedented ways, their most
striking features being the etatization of economy and the omni-presence
of the communist party and its ideology. In addition, at the time that the
Soviet system stabilized in a form that could not conceal its civilian
ancestry, Soviet ideologists and scholars began to insist that socialist laws
constituted an entirely new legal type.' 2 The claim of originality went so
9. The two features are noted, as traits common to all socialist legal systems, also by R. David,
"Introduction", LEC.L, voL 2, ck 2, at 3 and 8.
10. Although the principle of LEC.L that each legal system and its peculiarities ought to be
presented by scholars from within the system has been widely criticized (not only by experts
on foreign laws who have been deprived of the opportunity to contribute to I.E.C.L. and, in
addition, some of the Eastern European contributors whose national reports have already been
published in I.E.C.L, vol. 1, may now wish to rewrite them (to remain faithful to the principle
that a scholar writes current history and rewrites history of past events in accord with wishes
of the present superiors), their reports on Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia) may still be a
handy introduction into socialist legal systems. Theoretical (or ideological) underpinnings of
the reports can be found in V.M. Tschikvadze and S.L. Zivs "The System of Socialist Law",
I.EC.L., vol. 2, ch. 2, 115, and I. Szabo, "The Socialist Conception of Legality", EC.L, vol.
2,ch. 1,49.
11. See Norbert Reich, Sozialismus und Zivilrecht (Frankfurt a.m.; Athenaum, 1972), at 288
ff.
12. See Klaus Westen, Die Rechtstheoretischen undRechts-politischen Ansichten Josef Stalins
(Lindau: Thorbecke, 1959), esp. at 97-112.
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far that in 1964 a Hungarian epigone thought meaningful comparison
between the Marxian socialist legal systems and legal systems of the West
difficult, if not impossible. Thus it became obvious that new criteria of
comparison were needed.13 Since Bartels has left what may well be the
last, if not definitive, study of Eastern European Marxist and Western
approaches to the comparison of different families of law,14 I will
examine what I consider to be two basic approaches in contemporary
comparative legal scholarship in the west and analyze how they are
related to basic assumptions of that prevailing, mainstream, general
theory of law.
Some Western scholars have tried to find new criteria for the
comparison of socialist and other legal systems (and for the analysis of the
latter) within jurisprudential categories, that is, within categories that
have been derived by lawyers in, say, abstract or theoretical studies of
legal problems but which were not regarded as decisive by early modern
comparative lawyers in their classifications of legal systems and families
of law. A prominent and still discussed example of this new,
jurisprudential approach is Wolfgang Friedmann's analysis of socialist
legal systems in his book Law in a Changing Society. 15 In that analysis,
Friedmann recognizes that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 has been
one among those which "totally and violently destroyed the existing
constitutional and legal structure."' 6 He maintains, however, that
notwithstanding the many basic differences between socialist and non-
socialist legal systems "no basically new concepts and relationships" have
developed in the former.' 7 In his view, even socialist systems have had to
respect, although on a limited scale, the private property of individual
citizens and the entrepreneurial autonomy of state-owned corporations.'
8
At the opposite end of the spectrum of more recent interpretations -
which may conveniently be labelled as contextualist - is John Hazard's
landmark study, Communists and their Law, the first and still the only
comprehensive analysis of "the common core of Marxian socialist legal
systems." Hazard's book closes with the finding that there are economic,
13. G. Erosi, "Comparative Analysis of Socialist and Capitalist Law" (November 1964),
Coexistence, 139 at 151.
14. Hans-Joachim Bartels, Methode und Gegenstand intersystemarer Rechtsvergleichung
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1983), esp. at 5-22.
15. See, eg., W.E. Butler, "Marxian Concept of Ownership in Soviet Law" (1985), 23
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 281 at 283-85.
16. Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia
University, 1972), at 37.
17. Ibid, at 24.
18. See ibid
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political, social and ideological marks which distinguish all (including
Asian and African) Marxian socialist legal systems from other families of
laws. 19 He points out that these apparently non-legal features are a
normal concern of European law faculties but can hardly be seen from an
English and American law "school," which is "usually physically
separated and often emotionally apart from the rest of the university in
which it functions. '20 But he does not admit openly what his reader
cannot fail to note, namely, that his summary characterization of these
features are almost identical with the official and semi-official self-
interpretations of Marxian socialist legal systems with which the book
opens.
In the opening chapter, Hazard states the "basic laws applicable in all
countries embarking upon a socialist course," which were listed in the
declaration of the Twelve Communist Parties in Power of 1957,21 and
then quotes an influential Soviet textbook of the same year, which
translated these "laws" into the following three guidelines to be observed
by every Marxian legal system: (i) the leading role of the communist
party and the massive involvement of citizens in the political process; (ii)
the liquidation of private capitalist property and the end of employment
by private employers; (iii) the acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist world-
view and the working out of a cultural revolution.22 The only significant
difference between these guidelines and Hazard's own summary of the
distinctive features of Marxian socialist legal systems is that Hazard's
summary ranks the economic arrangements first and the political
arrangements second.
I believe that not only the first mentioned, expressly juristic, criteria for
comparing legal systems, namely, the criteria of sources and the internal
division, but also the criteria employed by Friedmann and Hazard, are
inherently limited conceptual tools for inquiries into socialist legal
systems. When I say that the criteria in question are inherently limited, I
mean that they are based and dependant on some higher criteria, which
function as rarely explicated tacit assumptions of the mainstream
jurisprudence, and that the higher order criteria, or assumptions of the
mainstream jurisprudence, provide a distorted picture, at least, of socialist
legal reality. To make good this claim, it is necessary to explicate some of
19. John N. Hazard, Communists and Their Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969), at 523 f.
20. Ibid, at 521-22.
21. Ibid, at 6-7 refers to the text of the Declaration published in D. Jacobs, ed., The New
Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (1961), 169 at 176.
22. Hazard, note 18, at 7 refers to Institut prava Akademii nauk SSSR, Gosudarstvennoe
pravo zarubezhnykh sotsialisticheskikh stran (1957), at 3-4.
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the assumptions and, moreover, to clarify Friedmann's own criterion for
the appraisal of socialist legal systems.
Friedmann's Law in a Changing Society is commonly regarded as a
sociological study of law. Without denying or disputing the sociological
orientation of his book, which makes it akin to Hazard's treatise on
communists and their laws, it is important to recognize that in his denial
of the alleged originality of socialist legal systems, Friedmann obviously
has in mind a traditional jurisprudential, rather than a distinctly
sociological, criterion, namely, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by
subjects of a legal system233 It is a prima facie relevant analytical tool,
which may need refining but cannot be dismissed. What is problematic
is the assumption on which Friedmann applied the criterion in his
appraisal of the nature of socialist legal systems. The scarcity of his
references to either positive or scholarly materials on Soviet and other
socialist legal systems is a strong indication that he has accepted what I
will label the first assumption of mainstream jurisprudence: the
assumption that law is not an empirical problematic subject-matter of
study, because what the formal sources of a legal system proclaim is by
and large observed in practice, so that one can competently discuss
general traits of, for example, Soviet law, by taking into account Soviet
basic legislative enactments and studies based on such enactments. Since
the assumption is closely related to another assumption, it will be
convenient to state the latter and discuss the two of them together.
In his analysis of the common core of Marxian socialist legal systems,
Hazard relies on criteria which are far more complex than either the
criteria of autonomy or the criteria of sources and divisions of law. In
Communists and their Law, as well as in other studies of socialist law and
institutions, he takes into account not only proclaimed formal sources,
such as codes, statutes, and regularly published decrees, but also available
judicial and administrative decisions and even assorted decisions adopted
by organs of communist parties and affiliated organizations, such as trade
unions. However, his criteria presuppose the second basic assumption of
mainstream jurisprudence and, as will be argued in section III, 3
reinforces a third one. By focusing on decisions not only of states but also
of communist parties in power, Hazard presupposes what is, as
persuasively shown by Lon Fuller in his criticism of positivism,
presupposed by much of contemporary, especially Anglo-American legal
theory, namely the idea or notion that law is a one way projection of
23. Kant may be credited with the classical philosophical analysis of autonomy, as opposed to
heteronomy, but the distinction is contained in older distinctions betweenjus dispositivum and
jusstictum, and is presupposed by distinctions between private and public laws.
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authority from above.24 That idea is, of course, also presupposed by
traditional comparative legal scholarship to the extent to which it treats
codes, judicial decisions, and other governmental enactments as the
sources of legal systems. Although the two above-mentioned assumptions
of mainstream jurisprudence are conceptually distinct, the second is
normally presupposed by the first, namely, that what formal sources
proclaim is by and large carried out. This is also the case with
Friedmann's sociological study, which is concerned primarily with social
change by positive law.25 For this reason, I will develop my criticism of
the first assumption within the arguments against the second.
At the time that the first version of this paper was being prepared -
in early fall of 1989 - my attempt to show that the view of law as a one-
way projection of authority was so misguided that it failed to account
even for the structure of then existing socialist legal systems in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, and that, as explanation, it was an outrage
not only to positivistically minded legal scholars, but also to social
theorists of any kind, not to speak of western students of the communist
world. At the time that the present version of this essay is being written
- late January of 1990 - the attempt may seem to be superfluous. For
in the past few months all Eastern European nations, except Albania, and
even some nations within the Soviet Union, have renounced the basic
provision of their constitutions26 - which recognized the communist
24. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969),
at 192.
25. See Friedmann, note 16, at 19-44.
26. Hungary: the Parliament voted to allow independent political parties (January 11, 1989);
the ruling party shed communism (October 7, 1989); national elections called for March 25,
1990. Poland: the government agreed to legalize "Solidarity" and held open elections (April 5,
1989); after an overwhelming victory of "Solidarity" in parliamentary elections (June 4, 1989)
the country's first non-communist president was nominated (August 19, 1989); the communist
party abandoned its ideology and split (January 1990); East Germany: the communist party
renounced its monopoly on power (November 1989); open elections called for May 6, 1990.
Czechoslovakia: the communist monopoly renounced (December 1989); open elections in
June 1990; Bulgaria: the leading role of the communist party renounced (January, 1990); open
elections in June 1990. Romania: the Front of National Salvation, the communist led
organisation which has assumed control in the country after the overthrow of Causecu's
dictatorship, accepted partnership with other political parties (January 1990); open elections
in April 1990. Yugoslavia: the federal congress of the communist party renounced the party's
leading role and broke up (January 23, 1990); open elections called for April 1990. See, eg.,
Vine (N.Y.): "There Goes the Block" (November 26, 1989), 24-28; "An Irresistible Tide"
(November 27, 1989), 32-34; "What Have You Done For Us Lately?" (December 11, 1989),
29-30; "Now, the Hangover" (January 15, 1990); and New York 7imes International
(February 1, 1990), Section A. On the national independence movements and the legislation
of opposition parties within the Soviet Union see, e.g. "And Now, Divorce?" (January 22,
1990), Time, 10-12.
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party's monopoly of power - thus showing the strength of the vox
populi to exert substantive changes not only within socialist legal systems
but beyond their limits.
However, I believe that my original argument was, and still is,
plausible not because of, but despite, the changes that have taken place in
the last four months. I believe that there are good reasons to assume that
socialist legal systems have been created largely from below, though not
in a way that is explicable by traditional theories of legal pluralism, and
that the future of legal systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
(or even China) still critically depends on inputs from below, which have
shaped them as socialist systems. To make good this claim, I will briefly
describe the peculiar structure of sources of socialist laws (II, 2). I will
then hypothesize about inputs into sources and offer a projection of
possible developments (III, 3).
2. Sources and Incognoscibility of Socialist Legal Systems
The reason that traditional theories of political pluralism, which are
concerned with the creation of law "from below" and find their source in
autonomous social and legal sub-systems, for example, in traditional
communities, economic markets, churches, 27 illuminate also the "nature"
- but not, say, the "structure" - of socialist legal systems, is the peculiar
relationship that exists between the communist party in power, its state,
and society.
A political party, a state or government, a society, as a system of
basically market relations, and a community, such as a church, can all be
defined, at least for some analytical purposes, as relatively independent
networks of communication within a broader network that can be
termed, for the sake of brevity, a social system. In a pluralistic,
characteristically western, social system, it often happens that a governing
political party or coalition of parties privatizes the state, by filling
numerous administrative positions with its supporters, and that the state
intervenes in virtually all societal relations, leaving only traditional
communities on the outskirts of its domain. But the four types of
networks can nonetheless be discerned.
However, in a typical socialist country, which is ruled by a communist
party, a new type of relationship between the governing political party,
27. See the classic in the field, Eugen Ehrlich, FundamentalPrinciples of the Sociology of Law,
trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936). Later contributions to the field include:
Georges Gurvitch, L'Idde du droit sociaL repr. (Aalen: Scientia, 1974); J. Glissen (ed.), Le
Pluralismejuridque (Bruxelles; Editions de l'Universit6 de Bruxelles, 1972); A. Allott and
G.R. Woodman, eds., People's Law and State Law [The Bellagio Papers] (Dordrecht: Furis,
1985).
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state, and society is established. It can be described metaphorically as a
relationship in which the communist party has woven itself into the state,
which has, in turn, woven itself into society: in Red Khmer Kampuchea,
the process encompassed even the basic communities, as evidenced by
the fact that the party dismembered a vast number of families. A result
of the merger of the party, state and society is a legal system that appears
to be a projection of the omnipotent (and all-knowing) will of the party,
which is rubber-stamped by the state. If it were indeed such a projection,
it would be a paradigmatic instance of the legal system that the traditional
positivist, especially Anglo-American and comparative lawyers have in
mind, which, needless to add, would defy description in terms of legal
pluralism. But in eastern Europe, very probably since the death of Stalin,
in China since the death of Mao, the appearance has been deceptive. To
understand why it has been deceptive, it is necessary to consider what one
can know about socialist legal systems and then make informed guesses
about their probable content.
It may be best to start from the common wisdom that one learns law
from its sources, whatever they may be. I have already given some
examples of sources and indicated some anomalies of sources in socialist
legal systems. Anthony D'Amato's theory of custom can shed additional
light on both the nature of the problem in general and on other salient
features of sources of socialist laws.
The gist of D'Amato's argument runs as follows: a rule of international
customary law is created when there is a state practice (usus) and
linguistic articulation that the practice is exemplary and binding (opinio).
The first element, usus, may consist of an action performed only once by
one state only; even a doctrinal opinion of a distinguished scholar
expressed in a reputable law review can perform the role of the second
element, opinio.28 These views illuminate the basic feature of all sources
of law. It is a fact that a source can exist in various degrees and various
appearanties and that its existence critically depends not only on the
observance of norms that are contained in it but also on the linguistic
articulation or appearance of the source as a norm-creating act.
A source of law functions best and is most easily identified when its
highly authoritative application and linguistic articulation are performed
by the same act or by a series of clearly connected acts. Thus precedents
are normally identified as a source of English law because English
judicial decisions claim they are based on precedents. Likewise, the
28. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1971), at 85 and 91-98.
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French Code Civil is normally identified as a source of law because
French judicial decisions claim that they are based on the Code.
However, it is essential to note that what makes English precedents and
the French Code paradigmatic sources of law are the following three
assumptions: first, that judgements do not merely invoke precedents but
are actually based on them; second, that judgments are observed, that is,
executed; third, that social relations which are not directly related by
individual judicial decisions also conform to provisions stated in the
precedents and in the Code.
Needless to say, these assumptions can be counterfactual. There are
many ways in which a source of law can fail. But it is important to
recognize that a source which has failed in some way can nonetheless
function as a source, albeit an imperfect one. An example is a practice
that is often imitated but poorly articulated, such as D'Amato's practice
articulated by a law professor only. A contrasting example is an
enactment that is highly articulated in widely circulated propaganda
materials but is little observed in judicial and other social decisions. My
claim, of course, is that a typical socialist legal system abounds with
sources that fail in different ways but are nonetheless sources of law.
The best indication of the phenomenon is the treatment of sources in
The Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, the best Western reference book on the
subject. What is missing in The Encyclopedia is a list of authoritative and
available publications of governmental documents where one can find
Soviet by-laws and leading judicial and administrative decisions.29 The
reason that these materials are missing is that they are not systematically
published or if they are, that they are only available to limited categories
of Soviet users. Dietrich Loeber brought the problem to the attention of
Western readers two decades ago.30 By now it has become widely
known, although, by its very nature, the problem cannot be studied
systematically: the secret laws are (or at least were till a month or two
ago) an all pervasive feature of socialist legal systems; what one can learn
from the regularly published official gazettes is (was) only the tip of an
iceberg and often not even the tip.31 Thus Vedomosly Verkhavnogo
Soveta USSR has carried mostly lists of decorations and sometimes only
29. EJ.M. Feldbrugge, G.P. van Berg and W.B. Simons, eds., The Encyclopedia of Soviet Law,
2nd rev. ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985).
30. D. Loeber, "Legal Rules 'For Internal Use Only': A Comparative Analysis of the Practice
of Withholding Government Decress from Publication in Eastern Europe and Western
Countries" (1970), 19 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 70.
31. I have summarized my first-hand (by no means exhaustive) knowledge of the
unavailability and secrecy of laws in Yugoslavia in I. Padjen, "Vadavina prava: perspektive i
problemi" / "The Rule of Law: Perspectives and Problems" (1989), 22 Domed (Rijeka), 347
at 354-55.
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such lists. At the same time, the official gazette of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR, Sobranie postnovleniia Pravitelstva SSSR, has carried only
selected decrees adopted by the Council, and, at least till very recently,
the latter gazette was not commercially available outside the Soviet
Union.
32
The Encyclopedia of Soviet Law also indicates the function of
documents which are not normative acts but affirm a fact, assert a right
and, in general, communicate information.33 The indication is misleading
in two ways. First, it states that documents in the Soviet Union can be
conveniently classified into official and private.34 The classification
should not read as implying that in the Soviet Union or, for that matter,
Yugoslavia, or any other socialist system, there exists an official or
authoritative concept or reality of government publications.35 Second, the
Encyclopedia states that, as a rule, a document must bear the signature of
the person who issues it, a letterhead, and seal or stamp. On the basis of
my experience in Yugoslavia, I am inclined to think that an official
document in a socialist country, as a rule, fails to meet one or more of
these and other common sense requirements of communicability.
There are more subtle ways, short of secrecy and sloppiness, in which
socialist legal acts and official documents fail. One is the notorious
civilian disregard for the facts of a case. When socialist judges, like their
counterparts in Italy - the cradle of civil law - and other European
countries, state the facts, they are likely to use as few words as possible
- and digest them when decisions are reported.36 However, the sparing
32. Gazety izhurnaly SSSR Katalog, a catalogue of Soviet periodicals commercially available
outside the USSR has not listed PostanovIenia... at least till 1986. It may be interesting to note
that in the mid-70s the European Law Division (in fact, research institute) of the Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. had only an - incomplete - photocopy of Postanovlenia,
obtained directly from Moscow.
33. "Documents", in Feldbrugge, note 29, 263.
34. Ibid
35. The concept cannot be formulated because in a socialist country most institutions are, in
the final analysis, departments of government and most official documents are withheld from
publication. A good indication of the reality of Soviet government publications, and of the
availability of Soviet official documents via such publications, is the fact that in 1986 Yugoslav
depository library for Soviet official publications (in Savajevo) received 98 volumes as such
publications, whereas the Yugoslav depository library for U.S.A. government publications (in
Zagreb) received 55,000 volumes as such publications (and was, in addition, flooded by
volumes other than Soviet government publications donated by the Soviet Union). I am
grateful for this information to D. Pomykalo of the National and University Library in Zagreb.
36. Comp. "[Judicial] opinions contain no coherent statement of the facts of the case, and even
those that do are seldom published with the fact intact. Instead, at the point where the facts
might be found, one encounters the disheartening term "omissis", signifying that a part of the
opinion is omitted. The emphasis is not on the facts, but on production of the polished maxim
(massima) and this abstract and conceptual statement, divorced from its factual context may
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vocabulary resorted too often conceals not only arbitrary fact-finding but
also whimsical legal qualifications of the facts. Informed rumour has it
that a Yogoslav administrative court, which has sweeping powers
comparable to the jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat, dismisses 80% of the
cases submitted to it with summary motivations which read, roughly, as
follows: "the act which is submitted for review is not an administrative
act and therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 37
The second way in which socialist legal acts and official documents fail
may be a Yugoslav specialty. In Yugoslavia (or at least in its constituent
Socialist republic of Croatia) motivations of judicial decisions in some
areas of civil (especially private property) law do not refer to sources on
which they are based at all.38 The apparent reason is that statutory
provisions in which the decisions are based have been revoked without
being replaced by new statutes. And there are cases which indicate that,
in fact, a new judicial habit has evolved: a judgement mentions the rule
(statutory or judge-made) on which it is based only when the rule is new
to the court that renders the judgement.3
9
This picture of sources of laws in socialist systems would be essentially
incomplete without a mention of three additional peculiarities. The first
is the multitude of collegial decision-making bodies at all levels of the
party-state-society structure, many of which perform meaningful
functions but are constantly hindered by the virtual non-existence of rules
of order. The second, which parallels the first, is the widespread
decentralization of economic, other social, and even some strictly
political functions, especially in Yugoslavia, but recently also in the
Soviet Union. Decentralization, often labelled as self-management, has
created thousands, perhaps millions, of autonomous authorities which
regulate important aspects of the lives of citizens without being aware of
the regulations they have issued.40 The third feature is the omni-presence
be the only part of the opinion to be published". Mauro Capelletti, John H. Merryman and
Joseph M. Perill, The Italian Legal Systen" An Introduction (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford
University Press, 1967), at 245-46.
37. This is not to suggest that a senior law professor would be in principle denied access to
archives of the court in question and check the accuracy of what is rumored as well as engage
in a comprehensive research into the unreported decisions of the court, and publish results in
a law review. But another informed rumor has it that the professor could do it in principle -
just as the proverbial Radio Erevan's Moskvitch can, in principle, enter at a speed of 100
km.p.h. a curve - i.e. only once.
38. See Prilog Nase Zakonitosti (Zagreb, 12 x Ann.) which publishes selected decisions of
Croatian courts.
39. According to two judges who have taken part at the legal theory workshop on the
interpretation of law at the Faculty of Law of Split University, December 12, 1988.
40. As the administrator of an institution with not more than 40 employees I once chased,
with the assistance of two administrative secretaries, internal regulations of the institution for
three months.
38 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of the communist party and, as a rule, the unavailability and possible
non-existence of documents that would indicate its presence.41 One can
only make guesses about the party influence on law-making. It will be
convenient to state some of the facts that allow extrapolations.
A typical communist party in power has an inner circle of activists,
which is probably much larger than the nomenklatura or its equivalent.
An activist, depending on his/her proximity to an important party
bureau, shares confidential information. Top party executives have direct
access to, and control over, the state security services. In totalitarian
socialist states, such as Romania before the fall of Causescu, or Albania,
a large number of party activists and of black-mailed non-members,
especially in universities and other ideologically sensitive areas, cooperate
with the state security services. In countries like the Soviet Union, where
there still exists a hierarchy of party departments that duplicates
governmental lines of command, the contact between the party apparatus
and party members is constant and intensive. In countries like
Yugoslavia, where the party has retained control over the state security
services and major appointments in government, the media and, possibly,
financial areas, such as banking, contacts between the apparatus and
members have lost much of their earlier significance.
An illuminating insight into the functioning of a liberalized communist
party in power can be found in a recent study, probably the first of its
kind, of the Zagreb party organization.42 Authors of the study were given
the opportunity to look into archives of the city committee of the League
of Communists and found, not surprisingly, that the main function of the
Committee in the late 1980's was the screening of candidates for some
3,000-4,000 administrative positions in the city of 800,000 inhabitants.
An interesting finding was that the city committee exercised its screening
powers, as a rule, only when approached by one of the candidates for a
position, presumably by a party member threatened by either a non-
member or a member of a lower party rank. The party, therefore,
communicated with its rank-and-file as sort of a labour court of last resort
for aspiring careerists. Given the fact that the role of the communist party
in Zagreb had, well before the turmoil of 1989, shrunk to the level of
41. See the illuminating account (only 3 pp. long but probably the longest publicly available)
by an insider in S. Zamashchikov, "The Disemination of Decision Within the Party", in
Dietrich A. Loeber, ed., Ruling Communist Party and Their Status Under Law (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1986), 53-55.
42. Eugan Pusic et al, Problemi integracife u komunalnom sistemu grada Zagreba / Problems
of Integration in the Communal System of the City of Zagreb (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet and CIT
GK SKH Zagreb, 1988). An abbreviated version of the research report is published in the
journal Nase teme (Zagreb), vol. 32 (1988), 3006-41.
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making selective, quasi-judicial interventions into politically-coloured
(nomenklatura) appointments, it is not at all surprising that the City
Committee paid special attention to the selection of regular judges: the
Committee screened more than 80% of candidates for judicial
appointments, as against 20% of candidates for administrative offices in
the City Council. Luhmann may interpret the selective steering as a
reduction of complexities, but a less sophisticated analyst may interpret it
as a sign that even the communist party has come to recognize the pivotal
role of adjudication.
What is known about the sources of socialist laws makes one wonder
whether one can at all comprehend what a socialist legal system, indeed,
what a socialist country, is really like.43 This is not meant to dismiss with
a dash of the pen the growing body of Western, especially Anglo-
American and German socialist law scholarship or the libraries on the
subject assembled by Eastern European lawyers. On the contrary, a bona
fide Eastern European legal academic will readily admit that, although
she has irreplaceable first-hand experience of socialist legal reality and
despite the fact that socialist legal scholarship is growing steadily in
quality as well as quantity, in order to understand what socialist laws are
all about, she has to consult the once prescribed Western studies on
socialist legal systems and their institutions. It is precisely the fact that we
in the East, in order to understand ourselves, have had to read Western
studies of socialist laws, which have relied as much on our own off-the-
record information as on documents available more readily in our
immediate environment, that justifies us in saying that the cumulative
knowledge of socialist legal systems is highly deficient.
I am, of course, not endorsing the claim of Soviet and other emigres to
the effect that reality within the Soviet world is, in principle,
incomprehensible to outsiders. Nor am I claiming that socialist legal
systems are not legal systems but something else. Although I will argue
that they are highly erratic and anomic (see II, 3), to claim that they have
been anomic simpliciter would imply that they have never existed. And
to say that they have been so anomic that they cannot be classified as
modem legal systems is to insist on the obvious yet miss what is equally
obvious the peculiarities of socialist legal systems are the mergers of
party, state, and society.
43. See Ivan Padjen, (Ne)cudorednost (medjunarodnog) prava / The (IM)Morality of
(International) Law (Rijeha: ICR, 1988), at 120-124 for a brief elaboration of the view that
social facts are constituted by norms, that complex social systems are constituted legal norms
and that, therefore, structures of social systems which are constituted by secret laws cannot be
learned by sociological and similar methods, which allegedly (unlike jurisprudential methods)
are directed at "hard social facts".
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My positive argument runs as follows: (i) the most fruitful definition of
law is that law is a process - aflow - of decisions that regulates, by and
large authoritatively and efficaciously, the most important social relations
that are, as such, conflicting;" (ii) in a socialist country only a tip of the
process (basic statutes, some selected - but not sufficiently representa-
tive and possibly misleading -judicial, administrative, and autonomous
decisions) can be seen and studied, especially in the most important area
of their party-state-society structure, which is regulated by administrative,
financial and labour law and, of course, by accompanying party
decisions; (iii) as a result of insufficient empirical evidence, even well-
intended insiders in a socialist legal system have a distorted picture of the
main traits of their own system. The picture is further distorted by the
ideological propaganda within the system and by interpretations within
the categories of the mainstream jurisprudence. To put it simply, what a
socialist system is like is not knowable to either internal participants or
external observers. To paraphrase Kant, it is a Ding an sic, but for the
prosaic the reasons stated above.
3. Socialist Osmosis and Threats of Change
Since a skeptic cannot claim complete ignorance, and a socialist
academic cannot resist the temptation to speculate, I will venture to make
claims, in the form of virtually untestable hypotheses, about probable
inputs into sources of socialist laws. The basic hypothesis is that, since the
sources of a socialist legal system are in constant disorder, the sources
cannot function only in the wad that they are meant to function by party
rulers and western commentators, namely as a one-way projection of
authority from above. It is more probable that they ate bent by pressures
which are not recognized by official self-interpretations and interpreta-
tions focusing on nominal structures of power. With this in mind, it is
possible to offer further hypotheses about groups that promote their
interests in socialist legal systems.
The first group comprises members of the communist party or, more
precisely, an inner group of party activists, including the nomenklatura.
Voslensky, a leading authority on the problem, claims that members of
44. The definition of law may be understood as a variation of the policy-science conception
of law. See, e.g., H.D. Lasswell and M.S. McDougal, "Criteria for a Theory About Law"
(1971), 44 Southern California Law Review; 360 at 382-390. At the same time, it is a
variation of the trialistic teaching that law consists of positive norms, trans-positive values and
social relations (introduced to Yugoslavia by B. Peric, Struktura prava / The Structure of Law,
1963 and developed by N. Viskovic, Pojamprava / The Concept of Law, 1976). The idea that
law is a flow of decisions is implied also by Kelsen's normodynamics and his early insistence
that only an efficacious individual norm can be considered a legal norm.
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the Soviet political elite are concerned with their own interests only,
namely, with the maintenance of their own political and administrative
positions.45 Although it is not advisable to ascribe rationality to political
groups, it is not unreasonable to assume that many members of the Soviet
elite - and members of the communist elites in other socialist countries
- rationalize their interests in, roughly, the following way: (i) in
countries like the Soviet Union a new type of a social system has been
created under the leadership of the communist party: (ii) the new system
has been in many respects a success: it has developed industry, created
jobs for all, eliminated poverty in some perennially under-developed
regions, and in one period achieved a higher rate of growth than
comparable capitalist systems; in addition, countries like the Soviet
Union, China and Yugoslavia have won an international position that
would have been denied them had they not become red; (iii) without the
communist party in command, the system would slide back into
capitalism and the party would capsize. If a typical apparatchik reasons
in the manner just indicated he is not prepared to defend his personal
position only: he is ready to defend and, moreover, develop and reform,
the system and he is likely to believe, at least half-heartedly, that he serves
the common good.
The maintenance of socialist systems has proved to be an exasperating
task, because they have been sliding back for years. But, with few
ominous exceptions in Central Europe, they have also displayed
tremendous vitality. After a bloody revolution of the Romanian people
their communist party reinstalled itself in power under an assumed name.
Just as the Hungarian communist party had done bloodlessly a few
months earlier. The Yugoslav league of communists seems to have
disbanded but it is nonetheless running the federal, provincial, and local
governments. The Polish, Czechoslovakian, and East German
communists are staffing key security services. The Bulgarian Party may
be breaking up but it is not facing serious contenders for power: all that
is facing is the apathy of the toiling masses, which may well be a more
positive attitude towards political change than the interest with which
Soviet citizens met the call of Sakharov's democratic intellectuals for a
general strike (in December 1989) to end the communist party's
monopoly on power.
However, the source of the vitality of socialist systems is not the apathy
but the complicity of the toiling masses in the "socialist democracies." It
does not take Thomas Hobbes to make us realize that contemporary
45. M.S. Voslensky, "Nomenklatura", in Feldbrugge, note 29, 537 at 539. See also Michael
S. Voslenskii, La Nomenklatur, lesprivilegies en URSS, trad. (Paris: Belfond, 1980).
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socialism, unlike its Stalinist predecessor, rewards by security citizens
who are willing to surrender their liberty. And since the latter commodity
has always been in short supply in Russian and neighbouring countries,
rewards need not be handed out lavishly. The Armenian jet-setter who in
Moscow is treated to a Big Mac will find her excursion from Erevan a
success. When Big Brother runs out of snacks, he can safely offer his
reliable supporters treats for their peace of mind: the realignment of
Czechoslovakia into a socialist brotherhood, Russian as the universal
language, or Bulgarization of Turkish names.
The ultimate source of vitality is the clandestine recovery of what is
being publically surrendered in exchange for security. The day-to-day
recovery of freedom, which unfolds as wheeling and dealing between
patrons and clients as well as between rules and citizens, which publically
bends proclaimed laws and secretly conveyed orders, is not only the
network of connections that makes life bearable and the cement that
holds the socialist system together, it is the key element that imbues
sources of socialist legal systems with their content from below. Large
parts of socialist legal systems, such as labour and administrative law,
especially in the areas of health and education, of which there is little
systematic knowledge even among insiders, are driven - in all
probability - primarily by deals made contra, praeter, and sometimes
even secundum legem. However, it is useful to bear in mind that the
people-made and people-perverted law which in its result is similar to
creations of legal pluralism, has its origin in the solid block represented
by the party-state-society structure of socialist systems.
If socialist systems are as stable as I claim they are, the recent changes
require explanation. It can be provided in the form of four complemen-
tary hypotheses which, admittedly, only partly support my claim.
The first hypothesis is that socialist systems in Eastern Europe, even in
the Gorbachev era, are nearly as interdependent as they were in the past
twenty or thirty years, the dependence of countries like Poland and
Yugoslavia in the Soviet Union being, of course greater, but not
incomparably greater, than the dependence of the Soviet Union on its
former satellites. That even Yugoslavia has been highly responsive to
developments in the Soviet block is indicated by the hardening of the
Yugoslav regime at the peak of the Brezhenev era (1973-1983) and the
loosening of the LCY grip on power with the advent of Gorbachev's
peristroika rather than with the disappearance of Tito and his old guard.
That the Kremlin has given, at the very least, its blessing to most "anti-
communist" actions in Eastern Europe is notorious: suffice it to mention
the early acceptance of the changes in Poland and Hungary, the surge of
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changes in Czechoslovakia, 46 and the rumours surrounding the
spontaneity of the Romanian uprising.47 The plausibility of the rest of the
hypothesis can be tested by considering two distinct possibilities. The first
is a conservative coup in Moscow. How would such an event affect the
willingness of the Romanian cripto-communists, Bulgarian communist
quitters and Yugoslav dismembered communists to run their candidates
in free national elections? The second is the failure of the newly formed
coalition governments in Central Europe to organize viable economies
and maintain political order. How would it affect Soviet readiness to
reduce its military presence in Europe and devote its energy to internal
political and economic reforms?
The second hypothesis is that, given the interdependence of Eastern
European socialist systems, the dominant position of the Soviet Union
within that family, and the nature of the Soviet social system - vast
numbers who may support moderate reforms but are likely to pervert
them at the grass-roots - positive changes in the socialist family of
nations can be brought about only by the Kremlin. The first step has been
partly completed. By allowing and encouraging democratic movements
in eastern Europe, Gorbachev's Politburo has undermined the external
might of Brezhnev's Empire. The stability of newly formed governments
in Eastern Europe and prospects for real economic and political changes
in the Soviet Union depend on the second step: the containment of the
military and the police within the USSR. Now that new forces "from
below" have been released, a bold step forward may reasonably be
expected.
However, a step to the side - or into abyss - can easily be provoked
by nationalist movements, which provide my third hypothesis.
Communism has for decades fought on two fronts. The struggle against
"liberalism" or "anticommunism" in the strict sense, that is, against
pockets of resistance concerned with human rights and political
pluralism, has largely been successful in the Soviet Union and the
Balkans, though less so in central Europe. But the victory on the first front
has increased losses on the second, where the war with nationalism (real
as well as imaginary) has been waged behind front lines.
46. See "Anatomy of Purge: In an Exclusive Account of Jakes's Ouster, Time Reveals How
the Czechoslovak Party Chief Double-Crossed Gorbachev and Lost" (December 11, 1989),
Time, (N.Y.) 3 1.
47. See A. Jacob, "Questions sur la gen~se d'une revolution: Les nouvelles autorit~s de
Bucharest assurent que le mouvement qui a renvers6 Nicolae Ceausescu 6tait enti&ement
spontan6; il y a toutes raisons de croire que, depuis plusieurs mois, les politiques 6taint h
1'oeuvre" (January 6, 1990), Le Monde, (Paris) 3.
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It might help to recall that communism promised its followers national
liberation as well as liberation for the toiling masses. The first promise
was to be realized through the soviet type of federalism. But the multi-
national soviet federation, ruled by the monolithic communist party and
managed by a highly centralized government, of necessity favoured the
largest ethnic group of the union. In addition, the promise of liberation
was broken by virtue of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. All members
of the "socialist commonwealth" were to serve the Soviet Union and,
indirectly, the Great Russian People. It need hardly be added that great
nationalisms provoked lesser nationalisms.
It is essential to note how communism formed, systematically though
inadvertently, its second face. First, by merging the party, state and
society into a single bloc, and by dividing that bloc into administrative
units which, where applicable, covered traditional territories of ethnic
groups, communist rulers stimulated their subjects to identify with the
bloc as a whole or, more in accord with traditional tastes, with one of its
(similarly single) ethnic units. Second, by gradually transferring powers
from the centre of the bloc to its territorial ethnic units - rather than to
democratically controlled agencies of government, autonomous social
organizations, and citizens themselves - communist parties created
regional leaders with near dictatorial powers and, almost inevitably,
nationalist aspirations. Third, by eradicating liberalism, communists
prevented the articulation of political interests in terms that emphasized
individual responsibility and voluntary associations; thus they diverted
their subjects to seek oblivion in traditional national and religious
communites and to search for leadership in the new nationalist
communist parties, states, and unions of writers.
The awakening of nationalism has been less pronounced in Central
Europe, which has been relatively liberal and ethnically homogenous,
with the exception of East Germany, which is sui generis. But even the
recent changes in Central Europe can be seen as national liberation
movements against Brezhnev's Empire as well as social, liberal, and
Christian democratic takeovers within communist countries. One may
also hint that the real driving force behind the changes has been a new
trans-nationalism, or at least Europeanism, which leads Poles,
Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and many Yugoslavs to seek larger unions
within, to use Gorbachev's phrase, "the common European house", and
free communication with the rest of the world. Unfortunately, it would
be an excess of courtesy to ascribe similar aspirations to ethnically self-
centred movements in the Balkans, Caucasus, Soviet Asia, and even
Russia itself. One hopes that they will not take the step aside, or into the
abyss, of massive bloodshed. However, increased inter-ethnic tensions
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need not result in the collapse of multinational socialist states. Tensions
my actually help federal governments to carry out, unconstrained by the
usual political concerns, comprehensive economic and institutional
reforms, as they have probably assisted federal cabinets in Yugoslavia in
the past two years.
The fourth hypothesis is that great religions will play a decisive role in
the events to come, just as they have played in the recent past, when the
atheistic propaganda and punitive measures could not contain them.
Religions, along with lingering traditional communities and emerging
patterns of urban life, have been the only appreciable autonomous
sources of social laws, in the sense of theories of legal pluralism, in
socialist systems. The Catholic Church was instrumental in the formation
of "Solidarity", the first truly autonomous social organization in a
socialist country, which started as a trade union and is now a senior
partner in the Polish government.
The Catholic Church has demonstrated its strength in other parts of
Central Europe as well, and is now on the offensive within the Soviet
Union. So is Moslem fundamentalism, which has been "in action" in
Azerbaidjan. A puzzling question is whether the action is indicative of the
contribution Islam will make to the resolution of crises in the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia. A related question is whether the recent
movement within the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has resurrected
the long suppressed unity of the Serbian religion, ethnicity and statehood,
and, on account of the latter elements, fostered a mutual understanding
of the Church hierarchy and the leadership of the Serbian communist
party, is indicative of the dynamism of the Russian Orthodox Church and
Russian nationalists and communists.
Vague as it is, the above-mentioned hypothesis about the impact of
religions on socialist countries may be the best introduction to a closer
analysis of a related problem, namely, the problem of "ideological"
influences on the formation of socialist legal systems in the past, subject
on which there remains much speculation.
III. The Civilian and Marxist Infrastructure of Socialism
It will be recalled that the main question with which I am grappling in
this paper is the extent to which socialist legal systems are shaped by
doctrines and institutions that are distinctly civilian rather than marxist or
socialist. In this section, I will argue that the influence of the civil law
tradition has been more pronounced than it is commonly assumed to
have been. The first medium of influence, to which comparative lawyers
and legal theorists pay little or no attention is legal science and legal
education. The second medium of influence of the civil law tradition on
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socialist legal systems has not even noticed either legal or non-legal
literature: it is marxism itself.
Legal science and education have managed to maintain the civil law
structure of socialist legal systems largely because of the strength of the
Civil Law mind and, more specifically, the counterfactual reasoning that
is inherent in civil law thinking. To understand how this operates in
socialist countries it is helpful to briefly recall how the Civil law tradition
was reinstated in Continental Europe in the late Middle Ages.
1. A Counterfactual Bent of the Civil Law Mind
Although the reception of Roman law was prepared by North Italian
judges, it was the work of academics. 48 Professors of the first modem law
faculty, organized in Bologna around 1088, were teaching Justinian's
Digesta (discovered or, what comes to the same thing, made intellectually
available, a few years earlier) as the ratio scripta (written reason) rather
than as a jus scriptum (written law) which had been valid imperio ratione
(by virtue of its reasonableness or rationality) rather than by ratione
imperii (by virtue of the imperial power). Law professors as well as other
educated men of the period considered Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis to
be a prima facie valid legal authority rather than a historical .document
sanctioned by an emperor who had been dead for five centuries, on two
principal grounds.
The first was a belief which, from a modern perspective, reflects the
absence of historical consciousness. It was the belief that Medieval
Europe was still living as part of the Roman Empire, which had never
ceased to exist, and that, consequently, the code enacted by a Christian
Roman Emperor in 533 continued to be valid law of the Empire. This
belief was not mere fiction. The late middle ages witnessed a rediscovery
of the European identity. Scholars in monasteries studied ancient texts
and taught them to their pupils. In 806, Frankish kings reestablished the
Roman Empire of the German Nation, which was to last, even though as
a loose union, the next thousand years, when it was formally dissolved by
Napoleon. Carolingian Roman Emperors reformed the Latin language,
which become the official language of the Court and the Church and
served as such for more than a thousand years: Latin was the official
48. The account that follows is based largely on Paul Koschaker, Europa und das romische
Rach 2 Aufi. (Munchen: Beck, 1953), 109 and passim. See also H. Coing, "The Roman Law
as ls Commune on the Continent" (1973), 89 Law Quarterly Review 505; Id, H. Coing, "Die
juristische Fakultat und ihr Lehrprogramm", in Id, Hrsg., Handbuch der Quellen undLiteralur
der neueren europaischen Rechtsgeschichte; Bd 1 Mittelalter (1100-1500), (Munchen: Beck,
1973), 39; Charles M. Radding, The Origins of Medieval Jurisprudence" Pavia and Bologna
850-1150 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
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language of the Croatian parliament until 1844 and the principal
liturgical language of the Roman Catholic Church until the Second
Vatical Council. In this context, it was natural for medieval scholars to
regard Justinian's Codex as sort of a holy, God-inspired scripture and to
add it as the fourth leaf to the treefoil of Christianity, Empire, and Latin,
which had constituted the European medieval world. But the theoretical
reception of Roman Law in the 12th century, not to speak of its practical
reception soon after, would not have taken place or would not have
occurred the way it did if it had not been prepared by a distinct frame of
mind.
The second ground for the prima facie validity of Roman Law in
Medieval Europe has two aspects. The first was the scholasticism of the
medieval law professors. What exactly the assumptions were with which
they were reading Corpus Juris Justiniani is still a matter of debate. But
it is safe to say that, since they considered Corpus to be a repository of
universally valid principles, they could find in it the necessary starting
point for the formulation of a theoretical science of law in Aristotle's
sense, that is, as a science or knowledge of law which, like theology or
physics, explains its subject-matter on the basis of immutable principles.49
Without some such attitude, medieval law professors would never have
developed the distinctly civilian habit of analyzing general legal norms
independently of the contexts in which the norms were created and
applied but rather as systematic relationships between general norms and
in hypothetical cases in which they may be applied.
Some legal historians and comparative lawyers have claimed that
medieval commentators imbued Corpus, originally a compilation of
pragmatic formulas very much like early English law, with a spirit that
was foreign to the original Roman Law. However, recent commentators
have pointed out that it was Roman law itself that offered the possibility
of, say, dogmatic or scholastic reading. Thus Alan Watson stresses the
fact that "Roman law, as it appears in sources divides naturally into self-
contained and self-referenial blocks" and expounds at length the block
effect of Roman law as the factor that shaped "civil law systems, their
rules, systematization, and legal attitudes. '50 Gray Dorsey goes even
further and claims that classical Roman private law doctrines were
49. Thus R. Dreier, "Zum Selbsverstandnis der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft", in Id, Recht-
Moral.Ideologie (Frankfurt a.M.: Beck, 1981), 49. Comp. Maximilian Herberger, Dogmatik
Zur Geschichte der Begriff und Methode in Medizin und Jurisprudenz (Frankfurt a.M.:
Klostermann, 1981), 203 f. on Baldus' method. See Aristotle's distinction in Metaphysics, 1026
at 18-20.
50. Alan Watson, The Making of the CivilLaw (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1981), at-.
48 The Dalhousie Law Journal
decisively shaped by Stoic philosophy.5 1 If so, it is not difficult to
understand why medieval law professors were so fascinated by
Justinian's Codification and to discern the frame of mind that prepared
the way for the reception of Roman law. They recognized in the
Codification a pattern of reasoning that permeated medieval thought.
This was the second aspect of the frame of mind that made the reception
of Roman law possible.
An attempt to describe the pattern of reasoning to which I have
referred could easily lead to a rewriting of the history of the West. But
Dorsey's masterpiece suggests that the distinctive trait that not only Plato
and Stoic juris-consults in Rome, but also the medieval law professors,
modern civilian legal scholars and, of course, Marxists, have in common,
is the urge to translate the highest truths into practical wisdom,52 a
translation which - to state the obvious - can never fully succeed. This
is what makes civil law reasoning counterfactual.
Common law jurists tend to believe that civilians would greatly
improve their legal reasoning by paying just a little more attention to
facts, namely, by stating them in more detail in judicial decisions and by
reporting and reaching decisions more systematically. This objection is
taken seriously by many European law professors, in the eastern as well
as the western part of the continent; for example, since the early 1980's,
the Faculty of Law in Zagreb University has been developing a
computerized data base that will eventually store all decisions of higher
courts in Croatia.
But Anglo-Americans jurists often fail to recognize that the civilian
disregard of facts is based on a healthy skepticism about the basic
assumption and intention of the civil law mind. At least since Kant,
probably since Aristotle, Europeans have been painfully aware of a gap
between high truth and practical wisdom.53 Thus, rather than being blind
to facts, civilians tend to believe that the facts of a case are always a
unique constellation of phenomena, which can be grasped by practical
wisdom only (phronesis, prudentia, prudence, Klugheit). From that point
of view, an individual legal norm, such as the norm contained in a
judicial decision, is not regarded as a deduction from general norms
stated in a code, but as a creation which, as it were, forces phenomena
under a concept provided by the general norms. For this reason, it is
51. Gray L. Dorsey, Jurisculture: Greece and Rome (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1989), at 64-72.
52. Ibid, at 54-63.
53. See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 106, B 169 on the impossibility of individual
concepts, and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1 139b31-1140b5.
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largely irrelevant whether facts are stated briefly or in detail.54 The main
concern of a civilian judge is to show that there is, after all, a rational (or,
perhaps, reasonable) relationship, which looks like a deduction, between
the general norms contained in statutes, doctrinal works, customs or, for
that matter, precedents.
A more detailed statement of acts would be required if civilian judges
were allowed to base their judgements on equitable considerations only.
But no legal system grants judges such sweeping powers, because that
would be the end of law. And there are good reasons why civilian judges
do not act like their common-law counterparts, who state the facts in
detail in many of their decisions and create from time to time individual
norms which are distinguished from precedents and persuasive
authorities and will probably be invoked as precedents and persuasive
authorities (i.e. as general norms) in the future.
On the one hand, civilians tend to believe, for reasons already
explained, that their judges can reach more equitable decisions by
twisting general norms than by dwelling on facts. On the other hand,
while informed civilians admire the common law mind at work, they are
likely to regard it, in the final analysis, as socially and intellectually
uneconomical: by emphasizing what is peculiar in a case (rather than
what relates it to a broad category of social relations), common law
reasoning promotes liberty at the expense of equality, blinds lawyers to
the social context of law and to litigation. In addition, civilians, who learn
the hard core of their laws from authoritative treatises, and who regard
legislation and, a fortiori, judicial decisions, as indicative rather than
conclusive evidence of relevant developments, rightly suspect that their
common law colleagues, not despite, but because of, their proclaimed
faith in the authority of reported decisions (and their parallel disregard for
scholarly treatises) in fact transmit the hard core of their knowledge
orally, thus preserving it as "the mysterious science of the law" that is
only or mainly available to professionally trained lawyers.
However, these objections, serious as they are, do not amount to
convincing reasons for rejecting a partial reception of common law
thinking by civilians. One can play with chopsticks, enjoy Japanese
cuisine, and include selected Japanese dishes without assimilating
shintoism and becoming fully-fledged Japanese. And I will argue that a
partial reception of common law thinking by lawyer in (ex)socialist
54. An important educational consequence has been the elimination of the so-called practical
jurisprudence from German law faculties. See Jan Schroder, Wissenschafls-theorie und Lehre
der "prakuischen" Jurisprudenz auf deutschen Universitaten an der Wende zum 19.
Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermanm, 1979).
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countries is a must if they want to modernize their systems and integrate
them into the international community. There is, however, a serious
obstacle in the way of persuading civilians to expose themselves to
common law influences: common law reasoning does not accept the
myth that, despite difficulties mentioned earlier, we somehow can and
ought to translate high truth, solemnly proclaimed in preambles and
codes, into practical wisdom and action. To exploit the analogy further,
the Japanese manner of dining barefoot may be an embarrassing
experience for a non-Japanese, especially for an ex-Westerner.
2. The Irrelevance of Obvious Ideological Intrusions
After this lengthy explanation of the counterfactual nature of civil law
reasoning it is not difficult to visualize how the civilian mind operates in
the socialist context. The fact that socialist judges write poor judgements
and that much of socialist legislation and jurisprudence is not properly
published has not erased the impact of the civil law tradition on socialist
legal systems. On the contrary, it has preserved the purity of legal
scholarship (which was never much impressed by legal practice anyway)
and increased the formative influence of legal science and education in
socialist legal systems.
In most Eastern European socialist countries, as in Italy and West
Germany, articling has been regarded as an essential part of legal
education, a part which presupposes university training in legal and social
sciences and takes place in law offices and courts of law, with little or no
additional systematic training in the nuts and bolts of law.15 It is not
difficult to see that the physical separation of the two aspects of legal
education, the temporal precedence of the academic side, and the
academic disregard for practice, which is partly motivated by traditional
civilian considerations and partly a corollary of the fact that the practice
is Ding an sich, results in the logical precedence of legal science in the day
to day operations of a socialist legal system. An inspiring lawyer in a
socialist country condemns the law professors on the ground that they
teach theory only and fail to prepare him or her for practice. But in the
end the professor in her prevails; she organizes her practical experience
55. For brief surveys of the organisation of legal education and training in major legal system
in the world see appropriate section in Alan N. Katz, ed., Legal Traditions and Systems: An
International Handbook (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). For more comprehensive
treatments of legal education and training in the Soviet Union see Jean G. Collignon, Les
juristes en Union Sovi6fique (Paris: Ed. du C.N.R.S., 1977), at 21-89 and 20nf; and Samuel
Kacherov, The Organs of the Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation
(Leiden: Brill. 1970), pt. 2, at 251-312 and passim.
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within the conceptual network of civilian legal science, or she does not
become a lawyer at all. This is hardly the best way to learn law but is the
way things are done on both sides of the (now lifted) iron curtain.
Since civilians are prone to interpret their codes as holy scriptures, and
since Marxism is (or was) the official ideology of (ex)socialist legal
systems, an external observer (as well as an optimistic party ideologist)
might well expect socialist lawyers to take the view that intrusions of
official ideology into socialist constitutions and codes represents ultimate
truths that must replace traditional civilian categories and thus be
translated into legal science and legal practice. I will suggest that such
intrusions have never lasted long and that even when they have given rise
to unusual legal doctrines they have left no perceptible trace either in
theory or practice.
The best example is Pashukanis' commodity exchange theory of law,
which reigned in the Soviet Union for 1925 till 1937. Following closely
Marx's theory, Pashukanis conceptualized law as the regulation of social
relations in the production of commodities, but a regulation which is also
a reflection of the relations it orders. He maintained that in socialism,
where the production of commodities is replaced by a planned economy,
law withers away and is replaced by administrative-technical rules.56 The
consequences did not please Stalin, who replaced Pashukunis with
Vyshinsky. From that time on, authoritative Soviet theory has taught that
law is a creation of the State.57 But little would have changed in operative
legal doctrines and in legal practice had lawyers remained faithful to the
commodity exchange theory of law.
In Yugoslavia, however, a strange doctrine was conceived and
implemented by the longest constitutional text in human history, adopted
in 1974, and a statute entitled the Code of associated Labour, passed in
1976. The striking feature of the legal system proclaimed in the mid-
seventies was that social property in the means of producton was
recognized as a social and economic, that is, non-legal, phenomenon
only. The new legislation induced many lawyers and social scientists to
justify and elaborate the new doctrine.58 Thus even judges of economic
56. See Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Obshchaia teoriia prava i marksizm, 3rd ed. (Moskva:
Komakad, 1927), trans. in John N. Hazard, ed., Soviet Legal Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1951), at 111-225. See a critical summary of Pashukanis' theories
in P. Beime and R. Sharlet, "Editor's Introduction in Id., eds., Pashukanis: Selected Writings
on Marxism andLaw (London: Academic Press, 1980), 1, esp. at 5-24.
57. See Westen, note 12.
58. See a discussion of main views in . Padjen, "Kritika politekonomskog i gradjanskoprav-
nog poimanja vlasnistva" / "A Critique of Politeconomic and Civilian Conceptions of
Property" (1985), 29 Nase teme (Zagreb) 990 at 1004-1011 and 1024-35.
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courts espoused the view, which was, in all probability, a correct
deduction of the Constitution and the Code, that when two social (as
distinct from private) corporations enter into a contract for the sale of
goods there is no transfer of legal title but only a physical movement of
the goods from one corporation to another. Now, every Yugoslav lawyer
knows that, according to the law of obligations, the sale of goods is a
consensual contract involving a transfer of title independent of delivery of
the goods. But the judges who were neither ignorants nor sycophants,
were paying lip service to the new doctrine: in fact, they were conveying
and enforcing legal titles to social property as if the new legislation had
never existed.59
3. Civilian Roots of Marxism
The Yugoslav juridico-economic experiment, which was quietly
dismantled in 1988-89, indicates the second source of the influence of
civil law thinking on socialist legal systems. It is the assumption - which
may well be the third basic assumption of the mainstream jurisprudence
- that law is a normative structure which is, somehow, distinct from but
produced by, and dependent of, hard, non-normative social, economic,
and political facts.
The assumption can also be found in Hazard's criteria for the analysis
of socialist legal systems. As noted in III, 1 above, he maintains that
socialist legal systems are distinguished by economic, political, social, and
idealogical features, which are a common concern of European law
faculties, but of no interest to Anglo-American law schools. Hazard does
not suggest that these marks are legal features. On the contrary, he creates
the impression that they are non-legal properties which determine the
nature of a legal system. In that he differs from his conservative legal
colleagues, but not from comparatists who believe that, for instance, the
difference between common law and civil law reflects half a millenium
(and probably more) of social and political history. Moreover, the
striking similarity between Hazard's characterization of socialist legal
systems and Marxists-Leninist self-interpretations reveals that he may be
tacitly endorsing the Marxist doctrine that law is, in the final analysis,
explicable by economic factors.
60
The doctrine which treats law and legal reasoning as a component of
the institutional and ideological super-structure constructed upon the
economic base is commonly regarded as a socio-economic grand theory,
59. See the last point in I. Barbic, "Drustveno vlasnistvo i poslovna praksa" (1985), 29 Nase
teme (Zagreb) 1036 at 1039.
60. See, e.g. 0. Kuusinen, ed., Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, 2nd impr. (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961) at 150-54.
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derived from Hegel's philosophy and British political economy, and is
incomprehensible in jurisprudential terms. I will briefly show that,
contrary to its reputation, this doctrine was most probably derived from
a pedestrian distinction formulated by Roman lawyers.
The Marxist doctrine of base and superstructure hangs on the
distinction between economic property relations, as the constituent of the
economic base, and legal property relations, as a component of the
superstructure; or, to put it simply, on the distinction between economic
and legal property. It is often claimed that Marx bequested a theory of
property that articulates this distinction.61 However, it is more probable
that he left no such theory but simply treated all relations of production
as property relations.62 Moreover, his theory of alienation, which is based
on Hegel's thesis that taking possession of a thing by forming it, that is,
by producing it, "is most in conformity with the Idea", 63 reveals that
Marx, together with Hegel, assumed the Romanist concept of property.
Hegel defined property as consisting of will and occupancy; he divided
the latter into taking possession of a thing by directly grasping it
physically, by forming it, and by merely marking it as one's own.64 This
is not the Romanist view of property but it is almost identical with the
Romanist view that possession consists of animus and corpus and that
it can be acquired by occupation, 66 fabrication,67 and symbolic
tradition.68
61. See, eg. N. Poulantzas, "A propos de la th6orie marxiste de droit" (1967), 12 Archives de
philosophie du droit 145 at 156; Hans Lottig, Marx und das Recht (Hamburg: Universitat,
1961), l; Otto-Wilhelm Jakobs, Eigentumsbefgiff und Eigentumssystem des sowjetischen
Rechis (Koln: Bohlau, 1965), 5-13, esp. 10; G.-W.
Kuster, "Zum Begriff des Eigentums bei Marx" (1983), 69 Archiv fur Rechts-und
Sozialphilosophie 107.
62. Peter Gey, Der Begriff des Eigentums bei Karl Marx: Zur Kritik der Klassischen
Eigentums-Paradigme bei Locke, Hume, Smith und Hegel (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag und Herchen,
1980), at 201, 138 and passim.
63. Richard Schacht, Alienation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 75 ff. Quotation is
from Hegel, Grundlinien des Philosophie des Rechts, par. 56, trans. by T.M. Knox as Hegel's
Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1942). Kusters, note 61, at 132 and passim, who
maintains that "Marx has a positive conception of property that founds the critique and
manifests in a conception of unity of labour and its conditions, in an identification of labour
and property" and that "(t)he conception of labour as a material action has a constitutive
relevance", would probably concur with Schacht's finding cited in this text.
64. Hegel, note 63, par. 53.
65. See, eg., Digesta, 41, 2, 1, 21. Historians of ideas may wish to consider a possible
influence of Friedrich K. v. Savigny's Das Recht des Besitzes, 1st ed. 1803, trans. by S.E. Perry
as Von Savigny's Treatise as Possession (London: S. Sweet, 1848; repr. Westport, Conn.:
Hyperion); Von Savigny's Treatise namely reestablished the constitutive role of animus in
possession in Germany jurisprudence.
66. See, eg., Institutiones lustinian4 2, 1, 12.
67. See, eg., Ibid, 2, 1, 26 and 2, 1, 34.
68. See, eg., Digesta, 41, 2, 1, 21.
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It does not take a lawyer or a philosopher to realize that the last
mentioned distinction between the three ways of acquiring possession is
a pragmatic device of Roman lawyers, which can serve purposes of
pleading and teaching, but ontologically is as illuminating as the sausage-
seller's division of his ware into thick, juicy, and yellow eatables. What
the distinction of the three ways of acquiring property most certainly does
not imply is that the fabrication, production or forming does not include
physical grasping or occupation, and that the latter does not include
marking or a symbolic tradition of a thing. Nor can it be imputed to
Hegel that, when he characterized taking possession of a thing by forming
it as "most in conformity with the Idea", he interpreted the forming or
production of material wealth as a process which did not involve
symbolic interaction.
But Marx's theory of alienation, derived from Hegel's theory of the
acquisition and alienation of property, either assumes, or is commonly
interpreted as implying, that the production of material objects is not
regulated by symbolic interaction (is independent of language) which
constitutes or at least formulates legal norms. Whether Marx actually
regarded or merely treated instrumental labour in the capitalist mode of
production as more fundamental than language is not a concern here.
Suffice is to mention that, according to a recent analysis, Marx
underestimated the regulating power of contract as the paradigmatic legal
institution,69 but did not consider symbolic interaction to be in principle
subordinated to instrumental labour.70 If so, Pashukanis' view that law is
both a reflection and regulation of economic relations which will be
replaced by technical-administrative rules, may well be the best
interpretation of the original teaching. What is important to note at this
juncture is that from Pashukanis to our own day three curious turns have
occurred in the Soviet-inspired marxism.7
1
69. Dona C. Kline, Dominion and Wealth: A Critical Analysis of Karl Marx' Theory of
Commercial Law (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987) esp. at 153-75.
70. Ibid, at 71 states that "Marx wished to restructure the producer/consumer relationship
from self-interested exchange or bargaining to some other form of relationship, where allegedly
the relationship would be one of mutual recognition of need." This statement, which represents
Kline's interpretation of Marx's view of alternative social relationships, does not imply that
Marx regarded all social institutions (which I consider to be constituted or at least formulated
by symbolic interaction, esp. by language) as subservient to instrumental labour. However,
Kline's other comments (esp. ibid., 162-63) allow a different reading, namely, that Marxed
submerged all processes of social interaction into the webb of historical necessity.
71. It is interesting to note that Anglo-American experts on Soviet law in their discussions of
Soviet property law and doctrines regularly fail to note not ony the shift in Soviet doctrines but
also the fact that the doctrine about the dual nature of property has played a prominent role
in Soviet legal theory. Representative example of such omissions are George M. Armstrong,
Jr., The Soviet Law of Property (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), a monograph which claims to be
based on the writings of political leaders and theorists as well as on legislation and judicial
decisions, and Butler, note 15.
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First, in the 1930s the old basic doctrine was reinstalled. It teaches that,
in addition to legal property, which consists of symbolic interaction,
chiefly by contracts, which can be reduced to a nudumjus or mere title,
there exists economic property, which consists of human interactions in
the process of instrumental labour and which is, as the economic base, the
determinant of legal, ideological, and all other social relations. 72 Needless
to explain again, this doctrine is a materialist ontology read into the
sausage-seller classification of Roman jurisprudence. The last
monumental expression of the doctrine is the Yugoslav Constitution of
1974.
Second, to make room for more pressing ideological needs, the basic
doctrine has been made inapplicable to other socialist countries by the
stalinist teaching that in a socialist country the ideological and
institutional superstructure, namely, the party and the state, can
consciously, by man-made laws, change its economic base.73 The new
teaching has dispensed with the impossible task of providing non-legal
evidence that in socialist and in capitalist countries socialist and capitalist
economic property relations exist respectively. The evidence that a
socialist country has established a truly socialist system can now be
formulated directly in terms of the romanist jurisprudence, which Marx
abhorred.
Third, the distinction between economic and legal property is now
used by critics of existing socialism, who believe they have found in it a
powerful analytical tool for the study of discrepancies between
proclaimed structures and hard realities of socialist systems or for the
reconstruction of socialist doctrines and policies. 74 However, the new uses
of the old doctrine do not show that the economic property - and the
72. See the authoritative formulation of underpinnings of the doctrine in Kuusinen, note 60.
The doctrine is probably rooted in positivistic interpretations of Marxism which had been
developed within the II Communist International esp. by Karel Kautsky, Die materialistische
Geschichtsanfassung, 2 bde., 2. Aufe. (Hamburg, 1929). For an informative analytical survey
of elaborations of the doctrine in the Soviet polit-economic and legal literature in the post
WWII period see Jakobs, note 61, at 13-28. More recent endorsements of the doctrine are, eg.,
S.I. Sdobnov, Sobsivennost iKommunizm (Moskva: Mysl. 1968), at 6-12; and "Sobstvennosta,
in Ekonomicheskaia entsiklopedia: politischeskaia ekonomiia, t. 3 (Moskva, 1979), at 570;
"Ownership", Great Soviet Encyclopedia, trans. of 3rd ed., vol. 24 (New York: Macmillan,
1980), 174-75; O.N. Sadikov, ed., Soviet Ctvil Law, trans. (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), at
111; and the article of the Czech Professor Viktor Knapp, "Socialist Countries", LE.C.L, vol
6: Property and Trus4 ch. 2: Structural Variations in Property Law, 35 at 35-36.
73. See Westen, note 12.
74. See, e g. Branko Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialisn A Marxist Social Theory
(Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1982), 235-39. H. Berman, "The Possibilities and Limits of Soviet
Economic Reform", in Olimpiad S. Loffe and M.W. Janis, Soviet Law and Economy
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 29 at 30 ft. finds this distinction, i.e. theory of the two kinds of
property, also in O.S. Ioffe's works.
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non-normative locus originis of law - has been identified. As witnessed
by Branko Horvat's Political Economy of Socialism, economic property
can be meaningfully conceptualized only in terms of rights, not brute
facts.75
I hope that these remarks concerning conceptualizations of property
and the earlier notes on the counter-factual thinking have disposed of
doubts as to whether socialist legal systems have retained distinctly
civilian features. It may well be that socialism is the civilian mind worked
up to a paroxysm.
IV. For a Jurisprudential Recovery of (Ex)Socialism
It is now common wisdom on both sides of the old Iron Curtain that the
future of the (ex)socialist countries in the formerly Eastern and now
suddenly again Central Europe, depends on the ability of socialist systems
to transform their political institutions and economic infrastructures into
viable social and liberal democracies and healthy free market economies;
and that, since Eastern European countries lack the capital and skills that
are necessary for such a transformation, a new Marshall plan is urgently
needed, but this time for the recovery of Central Europe.
Historical experience suggests, however, that a simple Marshall plan
will hardly do. Eastern European economies are where they are, not
because they lacked capital but because they have wasted in the last two
decades their - ever thinner - savings as well as massive foreign loans.
In addition, Eastern European human resources are not comparable to
the person power of Western European nations at the end of the Second
World War. Eastern Europe now is much worse off. Yugoslavia, Poland,
Hungary, East Germany, and probably the rest of the Eastern European
nations have lost in the post-War period, through brain-drain, more
skilled people than in the war. The "socialist osmosis" has not merely
prevented the promotion of qualified people to responsible positions: it
has prevented talents remaining in those countries from gaining
qualifications that could now be put to proper use. Most importantly,
former Eastern Europeans do not have to learn new mechanical
technologies only: they have to learn a new way of life in new
institutions.
If one believes more in facing the "New and Dynamic" than in making
historical analogies, one must even more readily accept that what Central
Europeans need most is knowledge and education, not raw capital and
brute skills. To quote the American management guru Peter Drucker, the
75. See Padjen, note 58, 1000-04.
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21st century is no longer a business society; it is a knowledge society and
it has already arrived.76
The view into the past and the view into the future suggest that
Eastern, that is, Central, Europeans have to learn first and foremost how
to build and maintain a different set of institutions. But if the analysis in
the first two sections of this paper have shown anything it is that we are
all in need of a general jurisprudential recovery if we are to create a more
integrated world. New, more inclusive unions have to be formed and they
cannot be designed and studied with antiquated notions of the now
dominant jurisprudence. The mainstream jurisprudence, which is still
based on a fixation on the nation-state, provides a worm's-eye view of
law that reiterates three antiquated maxims: exfactojus oritur (see 3rd
assumption in Section II,3), quod princeps solutus est legis habet
vigoren, and, quod non est in ac/is non est in mundo (see 2nd and 1st
assumptions in Section 11,1).
What is needed is a jurisprudence that will be concerned primarily
with international and comparative legal problems, and will be interested
in their origin "from below", empirical evidence of their development
and their ultimate moral foundations. 77 A systematic elaboration of such
a jurisprudence could be a major task of the Decade of International Law
(1991-2000), recently proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations. What is urgently needed is a speedy jurisprudential recovery of
Central Europe and of Western Scholarship of (ex)socialist legal systems
in Central Europe and the Soviet Union.
Western lawyers, their clients and governments, should find such a
project prima facie relevant and attractive. Western businessmen will be
interested to invest in Eastern Europe if they find reliable partners.
Partners will not be reliable if they lack expertise that is necessary for the
maintenance of open and stable legal systems. In addition, Western
lawyers can be poor advisors to investors if (ex)socialist legal systems
continue to be a Ding an sich.
The project would be, of course, primarily in the interest of lawyers
and governments in Central Europe, but, given the state of their legal
systems and legal scholarship, they may not know from which end to
start. In Section IV, 2, I will make a list of urgent measures but, at this
juncture, I will mention only one, namely, a partial reception of common
law reasoning. There are three good reasons for such a reception. First,
76. "Facing the'New and Dynamic" (January 22, 1990), Time, 42.
77. An inspiring beginning of such a jurisprudence is R. St. J. Macdonald, G.L. Morris and
D. Johnston, "International Law and Society in the Year 2000" (1973), Canadian Bar Review,
49-70. An attempt to construe legal theory as primarily a theory of international law is Padjen,
note 43, esp. at 125 f.
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as pointed out at III, 2, common law reasoning has certain purely
methodical advantages over its civilian counterpart. Second, modern
political institutions cannot be developed without a proper understanding
of Anglo-American constitutional theory and practice. Third, the
emerging autonomous international Lex Mercatoria is based primarily on
principles of American law.
78
In view of my comments on the limitations of the common law mind
at III, 2, my advocacy of the need for the reception of common law
reasoning may suggest that I am prescribing to my family as a shock
therapy a dosage that I would not dispense to my neighbours in a
generation. To avoid such a misunderstanding, I will state a principle of
designing a legal system which, at the same time, specifies institutional
limitations of the reception of foreign jurisprudence.
1. The Role of the LegalAcademy in a Legal System
The principle of design which specifies the optimal role of the academic
legal profession in a civilian legal system can be formulated in a variety
of ways, but I will compress it, somewhat bluntly, in the following
maxim: what is good for the academic legal profession is good for the
legal system that it serves.
When I say the academic legal profession, I think of autonomous
corporations of experts who have learned their law in the hardest way
and are, first and foremost, legal scholars. There is only one proper way
of learning hard-core private and public law in disciplines such as civil
law and criminal procedure: an extensive pre-university schooling in arts
and sciences, with an emphasis on languages; 3-4 years of undergraduate
education in law and social sciences, with a moderate exposure to legal
practice (in tutorials and clinics) but with a focus on the intensive study
(chiefly in seminars) of principles which are offered by sociology,
political theory, political economy and psychology, by general
jurisprudence and legal history, by dogmatics of major "positive" legal
disciplines such as constitutional, family and criminal law, and by
international and comparative legal studies; a period of structured
articling intertwined with a formal training in forensic skills, professional
exam, and perhaps a few years of practice in a law office, court of law,
corporate management, or public administration; a year or two of
graduate studies and two or three years of postgraduate research,
refreshed by some teaching to undergraduates or legal practice, and
78. I am therefore closely following the reasoning of J.G. Wetter in "The Case for
International Law Schools and an International Legal Profession" (1980), 29 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 206.
Approaching Aliens
resulting in a comprehensive published work which is a distinct
contribution to legal science and, as such, the admission ticket to the
academic legal profession; a life long commitment to research which is
aimed at a systematic critical exposition of a broad area of law and is
transferred to practice primarily by the vehicle of legal education (in
moderate quantities, not exceeding four hours of classes a week) and only
exceptionally by direct involvement in advocacy (when hard cases
require the highest expertise).
This way of learning law is in principle valid also for aspiring
specialists in the areas where legal expertise is only one of the essential
ingredients of a fruitful academic career. Since, however, a future
professor of patent laws, law and economics, or legal philosophy cannot
spend her lifetime cramming for exams, a systematic academic education
in a field other than law can be an acceptable substitute for formal
articling, forensic training, and professional examinations (and even for a
part of the academic legal education).
Finally, it is essential that legal academics, formed in the way just
described, be organized in self-managed and autonomous academic
institutions (law faculties, university departments, and research institutes).
Self-managed in the sense that faculty-members settle their affairs
themselves, their dean being primus inter pares; autonomous in the sense
that academic and administrative appointments are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the faculty and that the basic research and education of an
academic institution is financed by the state or para-statal foundations, as
long as external academic and professional evaluators find that results of
the institution are on a certain academic and professional standard,
irrespective of their utility.
I hope it is obvious why it is that what is good for the legal academy
is good for the country. It is because the legal system is better served by
legal academics who have received a proper academic and professional
training and who train in the same way all other legal professionals, most
notably future judges. By producing massive treatises on major areas of
the law, and by training their students to assimilate the treatises as if they
were exhaustive and definitive restatements of the law in force, legal
academics reduce the complexity of the law to proportions that are
manageable for ordinary lawyers, who have not received more than three
to four years of university education and a year or two of articling,
crowned by a professional examination. Moreover, by training future
judges in the same manner, law professors pave the way for the most
effective and economical development of the law by the judiciary. The
end result is a legal system which is relatively simple and, as such, easily
available, intellecturally as well as financially, to ordinary women and
men.
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A model of the best possible relationship between a legal system and
the profession which serves it is, of course, a picture of the best traits and
still undeveloped potentials of the civilian legal tradition in Europe. Even
Eastern European (ex)socialist legal systems conform in an appreciable
degree to such a model. But the European legal academy has failed in its
most visible, though not basic, function. Crowded university cafeterias
and empty lecture halls, sparse seminars and unimaginative tutorials,
inaccessible law libraries, and poorly researched term papers are
symptoms of the malaise of undergraduate legal education in Europe,
visible for decades and now becoming unbearable. In Eastern Europe, the
malaise has been aggravated by the "socialist osmosis", which has
additionally prevented legal education and, in recent years, (when prewar
academics, whose only means of survival had been scholarly excellence,
died out) ruined even the basic function of law faculties. Hence it is high
time for European legal academics to change the content, method, and
means of services they render to their students. A continuing reluctance
of Eastern European law professors to offer to their students the best that
can be imported from the New World may easily result in a paralysis of
(ex)socialist legal systems and the social systems they sustain.
But the point of this excursion into the best of all possible legal worlds
is that it is incompatible with an important dimension of the North
American Model. By European standards, North American legal
education is uneconomical, in two respects. On the one hand, the
consumer of legal services in North America must pay not only for the
time his lawyer has spent in acquiring his training (in the United States
four years in a university, three years in a law school) but also for the
unnecessary complexities of the legal system created in part by the fact
that lawyers are over-qualified for routine work and that judges, by
European standards, are not properly trained for the production of easily
digestible decisions. At the same time, law schools cannot pay teachers
who would be prepared to relinquish the opportunity to capitalize their
legal training in practice and engage in additional 3-5 years of graduate
studies and research. On the other hand, law professors, who have little
and sometimes no graduate training, are pushed by law deans to teach
three or four often divergent courses.
Having issued this caveat, I will now describe the reception of
common law reasoning that I advocate.
2. A Partial Reception of Common Law Reasoning by the (ex)Socialist
States.
The recovery of Eastern European governments and economies is more
dependent on the recovery of their legal academics (and of their faculties
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and institutes of economics) than the reverse is the case. For this reason,
law faculties need a shock. And, unlike massive unemployment of
ordinary workers, who will lose their jobs without having caused any
harm, a proportional lay-off of lousy legal academics would not only be
harmless (since most will be able to find decent positions elsewhere) but
beneficial. Indeed, the recovery of legal research, education and
information resources would be, for most of those involved, who love
their work, a challenging experience in the creation of a new world. I will
briefly state the principal measures that are prima facie valid for all
countries from the Baltic to the Adriatic and which include a partial
reception of common law reasoning.
To begin with, law faculties and research institutions should find the
optimal institutional model that will foster the autonomy and scholarly
excellence of academic legal institutions. The problem of autonomy
cannot be overemphasized. Liberalization will probably result in pressure
to make university research and education more practical. It will not be
wise to seek direct government financing. European (and perhaps all)
governments regard legal research and education as inexpensive
activities. In addition, governmental money is spent irresponsibly. A
better solution is a para-governmental foundation, financed by the state
budget but managed by representatives of the executive and parliamen-
tary branches of the government, principal "consumers" of legal
academic services (the legal profession, judiciary, public administration,
business), law faculties and universities. It goes without saying that no
financial scheme will work which treats law faculties as, in principle,
educational institutions. It may well be that the best solution is to finance
50-70% of basic activities of a law faculty by a science foundation and the
remaining 30-50% by a foundation for legal education.
There is probably little that can be changed overnight in undergraduate
legal education. One must first convert European law professors into
North American Law teachers, without losing European scholarly
ambitions in the process. But foundations which finance legal education
could easily eradicate the Sacrosanct European Academic Freedom
(which has emptied lecture halls and filled cafeterias) by enforcing the
Ground Rule of Academic Imagination: a student who is absent from
more than 25% of the lectures cannot take the exam and the teacher who
is found lecturing without a record of absentees will be fined. Students,
if not teachers, will do the rest, since there is nothing more annoying than
lecturing to a bored audience. Foundations which finance legal research
and education would greatly facilitate the enforcement of the Ground
Rule by granting special awards to teachers who edit the first two
collections of cases and materials for a standard course. Furthermore,
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they would facilitate the transition to case analysis and the socratic
method of teaching by forcing teachers to mark class performances and
students to take mid-term exams. The measure is absolutely
indispensable.
Central European lawyers and their governments will probably find it
necessary to make substantive improvements in their systems for the
professional training of magistrates, administrators, and advocates, and
will, to that end, send their experts to study the French L'Ecole National
Judiciaire in Bordeaux and the L'Ecole National Administratif in Paris.
Each country will also have to develop a national centre for the law of
European communities and, probably, transplant complete programs of
instruction in European law, together with visiting professors, to such
centres. This is an obvious option. However, the transplantation of
western European laws does not, unfortunately, involve great problems,
because it is not a threat to established Eastern European routines. As I
indicated in the introduction to this section, what (ex)socialist lawyers
may need even more than European laws is a sound legal education and
a sound knowledge of Anglo-American business and constitutional law.
North American legal education cannot be transplanted unless its
performers are, in large numbers, trained in it. The same is true for
business and constitutional law. A year of graduate education in an
American law school costs US$20,000, 5,000 less at a Canadian law
school. Costs are, by Eastern European standards, excessive and returns
are, by North American standards, low; a year is often not enough and,
what is worse, an American-trained lawyer cannot develop and use his
skills properly outside a community of common law lawyers and without
access to common law libraries and data bases. The solution is to
transplant the whole of the North American graduate program in law to
major Eastern European universities, roughly in the way in which
Denver Law School has already opened its graduate program in London.
What a North American law school would teach in an (ex)socialist
university is what it teaches its own first year students (Legal Method,
Contracts, Property, Torts, Civil Procedure, and perhaps some Criminal
Law) and electives in Anglo-American constitutional law and
international law, Human Rights, Business Organization, Taxation,
International Commercial Law etc. An advanced seminar in policy
analysis and planning (rather than independent research resulting in a
thesis) may integrate the knowledge gained in a cluster of similar courses
and develop skills in the analysis of a complex problem. Gradually, a
course in legal theory, concerned with transnational legal problems,
could be added. Programs could probably be accomplished within three
trimesters (12 months) or in a year and a half. Teachers would be, of
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course, visiting professors from North American universities, but the
involvement of qualified professors from the host country in elective
courses would be encouraged. Only students who had completed a
university training in law and who satisfied the admission standards of an
accredited North American law school would be admitted to the
program (L.S.A.T. etc.)
The principal obstacle to the establishment of such a school, which
could function as a permanent division of an established law faculty, is
not the cost of its day-to-day operation. The whole program could be
carried out by a faculty of 5 visiting professors and a few guest professors
from the host country at a cost of, say, US$500,000. This is not an
excessive amount if it is divided between 70-80 students, sponsored by
their firms and governments. The forbidding cost is the installation of a
common law library and on line access to major law data bases.
If capital investment under a new Marshall plans is anywhere needed
it is in a chain of law libraries in Central Europe. And if North American
universities have ever contemplated whether they could and ought to
assist their Eastern European colleagues to move to the center of Europe,
it is a good time to sit together and see whether North American
university presidents and law deans, professors, and librarians could help
with advice and with a recommendation to their governments and law
publishers to advance ideas such as those discussed in this paper.
Quite naturally, I think primarily of the Canadian government,
universities, and law schools. Canada has for a long time led an
independent and active foreign policy, with considerable understanding
for problems of developing countries. In this case, the Government of
Canada may recognize that by assisting the jurisprudential recovery of
Central Europe it is serving also the Canadian business community as
well as many Canadians who have roots across the Atlantic. An even
more important consideration is that Canadian law faculties - with their
unique expertise in both common and civil law, a similar position
between the legal traditions of England and the United States, and a great
expertise in international law and problems of federalism and human
rights - are uniquely qualified to provide the assistance that is required.
Finally, since I have been given this - equally unique - opportunity
to ride my favorite hobby horse at will at the pages of one of my Almae
Matris, I will allow myself one more liberty and advertise my first
university as a candidate for the host of a Canadian law school. Zagreb
University, located in the major Yugoslav industrial cultural center, has a
tradition of 200 years of legal scholarship and teaching, a law library of
-150,000 volumes, National and University Library with over 4,000,000
titles, and a large physical plant. A North American law school would
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not be an alien in the environment: Zagreb University has established an
interuniversity center of post-graduates studies in Dubrovnik, which hosts
every year several hundred professors and students from all over the
world; a filial Faculty of Law in Rijeka is now developing a Center for
European Business Law and is organizing the World Congress of Family
Law. Zagreb Faculty of Economic Sciences is opening a business school
of a university in Florida. But the distinct advantage of Zagreb over all
other candidates for the job is that the Yugoslav self-management has
relaxed further the Sacrosanct European Academic Freedom, so that a
Canadian visiting professor in Zagreb can recover from jurisprudence on
long weekends in Venice, Dubrovnik, Slovenian Alps, Vienna, and
Budapest.
